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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
More than 60% of the world’s refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR. 
The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being 
felt in the towns and cities of host nations. The notion of “refugee economies” has been 
adopted to highlight the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes 
of production, consumption, exchange and entrepreneurship. As urban refugees increas-
ingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global South, more research on the specifically 
urban economic impacts of protracted refugee situations is therefore urgently needed. 
Identifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refu-
gees is a key precondition for making governments more responsive to refugee needs and 
removing the barriers they face. 
South Africa has adopted a “self-settlement” approach to refugees. The country imposes 
no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical locations where refugees 
can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically separated from citizens, 
which means they have direct interaction with South Africans. The self-settlement model 
emphasizes self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in the process of resettlement, with little 
assistance from state authorities. Many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to 
access formal employment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their liveli-
hoods. Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politi-
cians, and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance 
is often minimized. 
The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call “refugee entrepreneurial 
economies” in urban South Africa. Within the informal sector, refugee enclaves have often 
been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow opportunities and limited 
scope for advancement. But this is a misleading characterization. It is important to recog-
nize the dynamism and growing complexity of South African refugee economies and to re-
shape our ideas about their positive economic impacts. In this report, we seek to broaden 
the image of refugees and their economic impacts beyond a narrow focus on their marginal 
status and vulnerability. They are viewed as dynamic agents with skills and capabilities who 
can play an integral role in transforming local settings and contributing to economic devel-
opment. The report also addresses the question of whether geographical location makes a 
difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial economies by contrasting refugee enter-
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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prise in a major South African city (Cape Town) with that in several smaller towns in a 
different part of the country (Limpopo province). 
Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentra-
tion of refugees in the city. In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant entrepreneurs in 
Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one-third of the respondents 
were refugees. In recent years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses 
in smaller urban areas around the country. In contrast to Cape Town, very little research 
exists on refugee livelihoods and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the 
second site for this study. The study focused only on informal sector business owners who 
hold refugee (Section 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Sec-
tion 22) permits were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as 
conventionally defined. In Cape Town, 504 refugees were interviewed in 12 different areas 
of the city using a survey instrument first developed by SAMP for the Growing Informal 
Cities Project. A similar number were interviewed in Limpopo in the towns of Polokwane, 
Musina, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou, Burgersfort and Tzaneen. In each of the two study 
sites, a “control group” of 500 South Africans was interviewed (1,000 in total). The sur-
vey was complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research 
location and three focus groups with refugees in each location. 
The first section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and 
small-town Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective 
socio-demographic and migration profiles:
t .BMFSFGVHFFFOUSFQSFOFVSTDMFBSMZEPNJOBUFJOCPUIBSFBTXJUIPOMZPGCVTJ-
ness owners being women;
t ćFFOUSFQSFOFVSTJOCPUIMPDBUJPOTUFOEUPCFSFMBUJWFMZZPVOHXJUIJO$BQF5PXO
and 77% in Limpopo under the age of 40. Very few entrepreneurs in either location were 
over the age of 50. 
t ćFSF BSFNBSLFEEJČFSFODFT JO UIF DPVOUSJFT PG PSJHJO PG SFGVHFF FOUSFQSFOFVST *O
Cape Town, the most numerous group was from Somalia. While there were some 
Somali-owned businesses in Limpopo and Ethiopian-owned businesses in Cape Town, 
the largest group in Limpopo towns was from Ethiopia. Some national groups were well 
represented in both places, including from the DRC and Zimbabwe. In both Cape Town 
and Limpopo, there were small numbers of refugees from the same countries, notably 
Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan. 
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t ćFNBKPSJUZPGSFGVHFFCVTJOFTTPXOFST	PWFS
BSSJWFEJO4PVUI"GSJDBBęFS
Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. In Lim-
popo, there is a clear time lag between year of migration to South Africa and year of 
arrival in the province. As many as 64% of the refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo had 
lived in another South African town or city first (compared to only 27% in Cape Town). 
t ćFNBKPSSFBTPOGPSSFMPDBUJPOGSPNMBSHFDJUJFTUPTNBMMUPXO-JNQPQPJTUIFQBUUFSO
of violence against non-South African informal businesses. Experience of violent crime 
and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for moving to Limpopo, which 
appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Afri-
ca’s large cities. But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimiza-
tion, it does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told sto-
ries of being robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police misconduct 
emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo. 
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, 
the Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range of 
economic activities. The vast majority in both locations are in the retail sector (75-79%), 
followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4%-8%). The kinds of goods being sold 
and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled Limpopo refugee entre-
preneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks, 
and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items sold are cigarettes, cloth-
ing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages. 
Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and 
other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they are 
selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of either 
group, South Africans dominate the sale of fresh and cooked food and refugees are more 
likely to be selling footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products.
With regard to the business operations of refugees in the two locations, the main find-
ings were as follows:
t ćFQSJNBSZTPVSDFTPGCVTJOFTTTUBSUVQDBQJUBM JOCPUIBSFBTXFSFQFSTPOBMTBWJOHT
Around 20% of both groups used loans from relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives 
and 12% gifts from relatives. Very few were able to access funding from banks, NGOs 
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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or the UNHCR. The main difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Lim-
popo were able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses.
t ćFNPTU DPNNPO TUSBUFHJFT JODMVEFCVMLQVSDIBTJOH FYUFOEFEIPVST PG PQFSBUJPO
keeping business records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy 
goods on credit, and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppli-
ers and the media for information about the price of goods. There was very little differ-
ence in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees. Living 
in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating 
with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs. Almost a 
third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, while most 
Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city. 
t "MUIPVHISFGVHFFTJO-JNQPQPBSFBCMFUPTUBSUBCVTJOFTTXJUIBTNBMMFSDBQJUBMPVUMBZ
than those in Cape Town, their enterprises are not as profitable. The Limpopo refugees 
earned less on average than their Cape Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 versus ZAR11,315 
per month. 
t *O CPUI $BQF 5PXO BOE -JNQPQP UIFSF BSF DMFBS JOEJDBUJPOT PG JODSFBTFE CVTJ-
ness value with significant upward movement out of the lowest value category of less 
than ZAR5,000. The proportion of businesses in the ZAR50,000-plus value category 
increased from 27% to 47% in Cape Town and in Limpopo from 15% to 42%, suggest-
ing that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better in Limpopo than in 
Cape Town. 
The establishment and growth of refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for a variety 
of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers including 
wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers. Around 
two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase supplies 
from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage. Refugees in 
Cape Town are also more likely to patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Lim-
popo are more likely to patronize small shops. The average monthly spend at wholesalers 
was very similar in both Cape Town and Limpopo (ZAR35,000). 
The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South 
African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to 
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pay income tax, they pay VAT on most goods purchased from formal sector suppliers and 
do not claim rebates.
Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners. 
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, this 
was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%). The average monthly rentals were very simi-
lar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in Limpopo. 
Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with 
refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for 
business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only 
4% in Limpopo. These rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month 
compared to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based 
refugees (and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality. 
The cost of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared 
to ZAR752 per year in Limpopo.
Fifth, refugee businesses in the informal economy create jobs. Around half (52%) of 
the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) of the Limpopo entrepre-
neurs employ people in their businesses. The Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were 
equally likely to employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created). 
While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total 
employees), both groups preferred to hire South African women than men (with 65-70% of 
South African employees in both sites being female). 
Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that 
one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South 
African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from formal 
sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure, luxu-
ries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating. 
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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INTRODUCTION
More than 60% of the world’s refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR. 
The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being 
felt in the towns and cities of host nations. In general, the presence of refugees among urban 
populations is more likely to be assessed in terms of perceived burdens than benefits.1 Only 
recently has interest emerged in what has been characterized as the positive “economic lives 
of refugees.”2 Some researchers have adopted the notion of “refugee economies” to high-
light the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes of production, 
consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and development of financial and capital mar-
kets in host countries and beyond.3 However, it would be a mistake to imagine that there 
are discrete spatially and economically isolated “refugee economies” in the urban environ-
ment. Refugees may dominate particular economic and geographical niches in the urban 
economy but they continuously interact with and contribute to that economy in ways that 
are poorly understood. As refugees increasingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global 
South, more research on the specifically urban economic impacts of protracted refugee 
situations is therefore urgently needed.4 
This report aims to contribute to recent literature that takes “refugee livelihoods” as 
its point of departure.5 A livelihoods perspective underscores the need to adopt a rights-
based approach to the economic activities of forced migrants; to identify their resources, 
assets and skills; and to understand how they respond to their situation and secure their 
livelihood needs. This perspective represents a move away from welfare-centred models of 
engagement focused on meeting basic needs towards a capability approach, which empha-
sizes refugees’ agency, right to choose, and ability to control their own environments.6 Iden-
tifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refugees is a 
key precondition for making governments and local elites more responsive to refugee needs 
and removing the barriers they face.7 This objective coheres with the UNHCR’s Global 
Strategy for Livelihoods, which underscores the need to enhance the economic capabilities 
of refugee populations and build on their own resilience.8 
The sizable case-study literature on refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa is 
dominated by an overwhelming sense of the problems they face and their marginalized 
existence, reinforcing an image of victimhood, exploitation and vulnerability.9 In recent 
years, a more troubling image has emerged of refugees as unfair and underhand competi-
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tors who disadvantage poor South Africans.10 Both characterizations suffer from obvious 
problems. The former treats them in a restricted manner as undifferentiated, homogeneous 
populations defined by their marginalized status as recipients of protection in the host 
country. The latter views them in a prejudicial manner through a warped understanding 
of the nature of economic competition and refugee rights. Undue emphasis on their legal 
standing as refugees tends to minimize their educational qualifications and credentials, 
skills, and work experience in various fields. Furthermore, it underestimates their creative 
energies, determination and ability to overcome some of these challenges and rebuild their 
lives in South Africa. 
Post-apartheid South Africa has relied on a “self-settlement” approach to refugees.11 
The country imposes no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical loca-
tions where refugees can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically sepa-
rated from citizens, which means they have direct interaction with South Africans with 
the potential for both conflict and integration into local communities. However, the South 
African self-settlement model does emphasize self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in 
the process of resettlement, with little assistance from state authorities.12 Existing studies 
suggest that many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to access formal employ-
ment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their livelihoods.13 Employment or 
self-employment in the informal economy becomes a desirable option, if not a necessity. 
Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politicians, 
and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance is often 
minimized.14 
The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call “refugee entrepreneurial 
economies” in urban South Africa. The report builds on case-study evidence on the activi-
ties of refugees in the South African informal economy.15 Within the informal sector, refu-
gee enclaves have often been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow 
opportunities and limited scope for advancement. But this, too, is a misleading character-
ization. It is important to recognize the dynamism and growing complexity of South Afri-
can refugee economies and to re-shape our ideas about their positive economic impacts.16 
The important question is whether all forms of refugee activity in the informal sector are 
associated with economic precariousness and social marginality, or whether possibilities 
for real economic advancement exist.17 
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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In this report, we seek to broaden the image of refugees and their economic impacts 
beyond a narrow focus on their marginal status and vulnerability. We view them as dynamic 
agents with skills and capabilities who can play an integral role in transforming local set-
tings and contributing to economic development. This is not to undervalue the divergent 
ways through which refugees earn a living in South Africa, nor to gloss over their struggles 
and the pervasive discrimination, hostility and xenophobic violence they regularly encoun-
ter, nor to exaggerate the significance of refugee entrepreneurship. However, there is a need 
to recalibrate the narrow, partial and negative lens through which their economic poten-
tial is evaluated by politicians and policy-makers. Here, we also address the question of 
whether geographical location makes a difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial 
economies by contrasting refugee enterprise in a major South African city (Cape Town) 
with that in several smaller towns in a different part of the country (Limpopo province). 
Our aim is to ascertain whether geography matters in framing the activities, challenges and 
impacts of refugee entrepreneurial economies. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Most refugees are initially drawn to the major South African cities of Johannesburg, Dur-
ban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. In this study of refugee entrepreneurship, the city of 
Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentration 
of refugees and a contextual literature on refugee entrepreneurship in the city.18 In recent 
years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses in smaller urban areas 
around the country. A police campaign called Operation Hardstick in Limpopo province in 
2012 forcibly closed as many as 600 small businesses run by migrants and refugees, suggest-
ing that this province had become a significant operating location for small-town entrepre-
neurs. In contrast to Cape Town, however, very little research exists on refugee livelihoods 
and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the second site for this study.19 
The study focused only on informal sector business owners who hold refugee (Sec-
tion 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits 
were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as conventionally 
defined. The South African government claims that 90% of asylum-seeker permit holders 
are “economic migrants” and not genuine refugees as defined by the Refugee Conventions. 
While this figure has been disputed by researchers, it is not possible to predict whether 
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any particular asylum-seeker permit holder will make the transition to full refugee status. 
Indeed, the majority probably will not.20 In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant 
entrepreneurs in Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one third of 
the respondents were refugees.21 All potential respondents were asked if they had a Section 
24 permit as a filtering question. They were not asked to show their permits to verify their 
claim as this would have been intrusive and redolent of police (mis)conduct. It is therefore 
possible that some of the respondents did not have Section 24 permits (which could explain 
why a small number were from countries with a limited or non-existent official record of 
successful refugee applications in South Africa). However, it is also possible to buy a false 
Section 24 permit through various back channels. 
The number and geographical location of refugee enterprises in South Africa is 
unknown, which means that there is no comprehensive population from which to draw a 
sample. The study therefore relied on maximum variation sampling (MVS) using the meth-
odology suggested by a recent study of the informal economy in Bangalore.22 The basic 
principle is that by randomly sampling within a selection of diverse and contrasting areas 
of the city, researchers can arrive at a sample that is very close to being representative. 
In Cape Town, the areas of the city in which the informal economy is known to operate 
were first identified. This allowed for the exclusion of significant areas of the city from the 
study, particularly high-income residential areas. Second, five different types of area were 
identified – commercial, formal residential, informal residential, mixed formal and infor-
mal residential, and industrial. Within each of these types, contrasting and geographically 
separated areas were chosen. There were two commercial areas (the CBD and Bellville), two 
industrial areas (Maitland and Parow), three formal residential areas (Observatory, Delft 
and Nyanga), three informal settlements (Khayelitsha, Imizamo Yethu and Masiphumelele) 
and two mixed formal and informal residential areas (Philippi and Dunoon). 
The number of refugee business owners interviewed in each suburb is listed in Table 
1. An attempt was made to interview similar numbers in each area. However, this was not 
always possible as it soon became evident that refugee entrepreneurs tend to cluster in cer-
tain areas of the city. In Nyanga, Dunoon and Masiphumelele, for example, where there is a 
great deal of hostility towards foreign nationals, it was difficult to find refugees conducting 
businesses. In contrast, residential areas such as Parow, Maitland, Cape Town CBD, Bell-
ville and Observatory are considered relatively safe areas to conduct business. Interviews 
in one pre-selected area could not be carried out because of the intervention of the local 
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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taxi association which demanded financial recompense in exchange for access to the area. 
It transpired that the association was running a protection racket, obliging refugees to pay 
daily “fees” for operating in the area. The association later changed its position on access but 
by then another area had been selected and the interviews completed. 
Table 1: Cape Town Interview Locations 
Suburb No. 
Bellville 91
CBD 103
Delft 26
Imizamo Yethu 34
Khayelitsha 25
Maitland 40
Masiphumelele 10
Parow 82
Philippi 21
Dunoon 42
Nyanga 3
Observatory 27
Total 504
In Limpopo, the majority of migrant entrepreneurs live in urban centres. Since many 
of these centres are relatively small, the primary criterion for the application of MVS in 
Limpopo was variable urban size. The selected towns are scattered around the province 
and include Polokwane (population of 130,000), Thohoyandou (70,000), Musina (43,000), 
Louis Trichardt (25,000), Tzaneen (14,500) and Burgersfort (6,000). The number of refu-
gee business owners interviewed in each town is listed in Table 2. In Musina, close to the 
Zimbabwean border, the informal trade is dominated by refugees from countries including 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, who deal in retail targeted at the Zimbabwean market. The 
same is true of Burgersfort, where most local people prefer to lease their business prem-
ises to migrants and refugees rather than operate businesses themselves. In Tzaneen and 
Polokwane, however, informal businesses operated by South Africans tend to dominate. In 
Tzaneen, in particular, there were few refugee entrepreneurs operating and those who were 
tended to congregate in the CBD. 
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Table 2: Limpopo Interview Locations 
Town No.
Polokwane 159
Musina 121
Louis Trichardt 36
Thohoyandou 59
Burgersfort 96
Tzaneen 33
Total surveyed 504
Sampling was conducted in each site using the mapped grid-pattern exhibited by streets. 
Streets were sampled one after another in successive fashion moving from west to east. 
After identifying the first five enterprises on a street, and randomly selecting the first of the 
five for the sample, every third refugee-owned enterprise was selected for interview. Where 
business owners were not available, fieldworkers made three call backs to the enterprise, 
after which a substitution was made. In the two study areas combined, a total of 1,008 refu-
gee entrepreneurs were interviewed. The survey was administered using tablet technology 
and collected information on a wide variety of issues pertaining to business set-up, activi-
ties, operation, profitability, challenges, and economic impacts. The enterprise survey was 
complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research location 
and three focus groups with refugees from the same country in each location. 
REFUGEE PROFILE
This section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and small-
town Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective socio-
demographic and migration profiles. First, male refugee entrepreneurs clearly dominate in 
both areas, with only 20-25% of business owners being women (Table 3). This is generally 
consistent with the predominantly male character of refugee migration to South Africa. 
The entrepreneurs in both locations tend to be relatively young with 80% in Cape Town and 
77% in Limpopo under the age of 40. Very few entrepreneurs in either location were over 
the age of 50. Accepting the International Labour Organization definition of “youth” in 
Africa as anyone under the age of 35, this would mean that 54% of those in Cape Town and 
refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa
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57% of those in Limpopo are youth entrepreneurs.23 This means that there are no significant 
differences between the two groups of entrepreneurs in terms of age profile. However, it 
does mean that the difficulties and challenges facing young entrepreneurs in South Africa, 
and how these are addressed by refugee youth, warrant further investigation.24 
Table 3: Sex, Age and Country of Origin Profile of Refugee Entrepreneurs
Cape Town % Limpopo %
Sex
Male 75.2 80.0
Female 24.8 20.0
Age
<21 0.0 0.2
21-25 8.5 10.8
26-30 20.1 23.4
31-35 25.2 22.2
36-40 26.6 21.0
41-45 12.2 11.4
46-50 4.3 6.8
>50 3.0 4.4
Country of origin
Somalia 26.9 7.4
DRC 16.9 11.0
Cameroon 11.6 0.8
Ethiopia 9.2 28.1
Zimbabwe 7.2 11.1
Congo Brazzaville 3.0 0.6
Burundi 1.4 0.6
Angola 1.0 0.6
Rwanda 0.8 0.2
Sudan 0.2 1.0
Eritrea 0.2 4.6
Other 21.6 34.4
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Despite the similarities in sex and age breakdown between the two samples, there are 
marked differences in the countries of origin of refugee entrepreneurs. In the Cape Town 
sample, the most numerous group was from Somalia, which is consistent with other studies 
showing a significant Somali presence in the informal economy of the city.25 While there 
are some Somali-owned businesses in Limpopo and Ethiopian-owned businesses in Cape 
Town, the largest group in this sample of refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo towns was 
from Ethiopia (28%). Some national groups are well represented in both places, including 
refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (17% in Cape Town and 11% 
in Limpopo) and Zimbabwe (7% in Cape Town and 11% in Limpopo). In both the Cape 
Town and Limpopo samples, there are small numbers of refugees from the same countries, 
notably Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan. In sum, both 
areas are dominated by refugees from one or two (different) countries but after that there is 
considerable diversity in the makeup of the refugee entrepreneurial population. 
The vast majority of sampled refugee business owners (over 90% in both research loca-
tions) arrived in South Africa after 2000 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Year of Arrival in South Africa
Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. For exam-
ple, 71% of the refugees in Limpopo migrated to South Africa after 2005 compared to 61% 
of those in Cape Town. Or again, 26% of those in Limpopo arrived in South Africa after 
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2010, compared to only 16% in Cape Town. This raises the possibility that more recent 
forced migrants may be avoiding the large cities and going straight to smaller urban cen-
tres. However, in Limpopo there is a clear lag between year of migration to South Africa 
and year of arrival in the province (Figure 2). As many as 64% of the sampled refugee 
entrepreneurs in Limpopo had lived in another South African town or city first (compared 
to only 27% in Cape Town) (Table 4). In other words, Cape Town was the first destination 
for nearly three-quarters of the refugee entrepreneurs in that sample while Limpopo was 
the first destination for only 13% of the entrepreneurs sampled there. 
Figure 2: Migration of Limpopo Entrepreneurs
In the Limpopo sample, previous places of residence were dominated by the large cities, 
especially Johannesburg (29%) and Pretoria (13%), but also Durban (5%) and even Cape 
Town (5%), which is nearly 2,000 km away. The movement of refugees from Limpopo to 
Cape Town was much more limited. As many as 17% of the Limpopo refugees had lived 
in another town in the province, suggesting the existence of some intra-provincial mobil-
ity. This kind of movement was virtually absent in the case of Cape Town and the Western 
Cape province. In the Cape Town sample, the majority of the 28% who had lived in another 
urban area came from Johannesburg, with much smaller numbers from cities such as Pre-
toria and Durban. 
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Table 4: Previous Places of Residence in South Africa 
Cape Town % Limpopo %
Major cities
Johannesburg 15.7 29.0
Pretoria 4.2 12.9
Durban 3.2 5.0
Cape Town n/a 4.6
Port Elizabeth 1.6 2.4
Other urban centres
Other Western Cape 0.2 1.2
Other Limpopo 1.2 16.9
Other Gauteng 0.0 1.6
Other KwaZulu-Natal 0.2 1.2
Other Eastern Cape 0.2 0.2
Free State 0.4 1.6
North West 0.2 1.6
Northern Cape 0.6 1.4
Mpumalanga 0.4 6.7
Note: Multiple response question
The major reason for relocation from large cities to small-town Limpopo is clearly the 
pattern of violence against non-South African informal businesses.26 Nationwide xeno-
phobic attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 led to considerable loss of life, damage 
to property and internal displacement.27 In 2015, widespread xenophobic violence again 
wracked the country. Unlike the indiscriminate violence of 2008, these attacks mainly 
targeted small informal businesses run by migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Media 
coverage of xenophobic incidents chronicles an escalating pattern of xenophobic violence 
directed at migrants and refugees between 2008 and 2015.28 Refugee-owned businesses 
are regular targets of attacks and certain locations have witnessed collective violence in 
repeated cycles, including loss of store contents through looting and arson, damage to shop 
structures, forcible store closures, temporary or permanent displacement, and loss of life.29 
The impact of xenophobic violence is exacerbated by poor police response and follow-up. 
Refugees have little faith in police protection or judicial reparation.30 According to one 
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study, the perceived failure of the authorities to control migration has exacerbated violent 
attacks on migrants and refugees.31 
Some studies have suggested that attacks on refugee-owned businesses are instigated or 
orchestrated by South African competitors, including various shadowy informal business 
associations.32 This phenomenon – dubbed “violent entrepreneurship” – involves the use of 
intimidatory violence as a business strategy to drive non-South African competitors out of 
an area.33 The most frequent and intense xenophobic attacks and instances of violent entre-
preneurship have occurred in low-income neighbourhoods in large cities. The in-depth 
interviews with Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs confirmed that xenophobic violence was 
a major factor in relocation from cities of first refuge. One Somali refugee recounted how 
he had arrived in Johannesburg after a long and difficult journey through several coun-
tries; experiences consistent with that of other Somali refugees.34 In Johannesburg, he lived 
with his brother and neighbours from the same village in Somalia. His brother operated a 
business buying goods in the CBD and selling them at his shop in Soweto. He worked for 
his brother for a while but found the experience unnerving: “I did not want to operate in 
Soweto. The people there were nice but there were others who were just rough. I had seen 
two people being killed in broad daylight and they were all foreigners and their shops were 
robbed. So I wanted to go somewhere else.” With his brother’s assistance he bought a small 
spaza (informal shop) in Orange Farm south of Johannesburg and ran it for a year:
Orange Farm was a good area for business but it was not safe. As a foreigner 
you are always conscious of your security and you can feel that this place is not 
good. It is far from the Johannesburg CBD and there are few police there. So 
even when there are robberies, the police come very late and sometimes they do 
not come at all. I was robbed seven times in the period that I stayed in Orange 
Farm. Most of the time the robbers would come when it is at night and you are 
still operating. They pounce on you with sticks, spanners or iron bars and they 
hit you hard. So I was almost killed twice and I thought this is enough. Let me 
leave this place. Then I left and came here.35 
Experience of violent crime and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for 
moving to Limpopo. Interviewees moved to escape being injured or murdered rather than 
specifically to set up a new business. One Eritrean refugee, for example, had his spaza looted 
and burnt to the ground: “I came here because I was running for my life. I was not thinking 
of doing business, but of surviving. I was almost killed that night.”36 
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Some have said that South African business owners are just as vulnerable to violent 
attacks and crime as their refugee counterparts and suggest that xenophobia is therefore 
not a factor.37 However, the interviewees in Limpopo clearly saw the violence in Johannes-
burg and other centres as motivated by xenophobia. As the former Orange Farm business 
owner noted: “There were many spaza shops around me, but they kept stealing from me. Is 
that not xenophobia? Why not steal from the locals? The customers sometimes harass you 
because you are a foreigner. They take your goods and are a problem in paying. So, yes, I 
have been affected a lot by xenophobia.”
Limpopo province appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environ-
ment than South Africa’s large cities. As many as 45% of sampled Cape Town refugees said 
that xenophobia had affected their business operations to some extent (20%) or a great deal 
(25%). The equivalent figures in Limpopo were 31% in total (19% to some extent and 12% 
not at all). Refugees in Cape Town appear to be more vulnerable to theft and physical attack 
from South African citizens. In the sample, 57% of refugees in Cape Town reported often or 
sometimes having goods and stock stolen compared to 39% in Limpopo. Similarly, 54% in 
Cape Town often or sometimes had money stolen compared to 32% in Limpopo. 
But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it certainly 
does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being 
robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police disregard for the rights of 
refugees and migrants is a significant problem in Cape Town and other large cities.38 How-
ever, police misconduct emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo. This survey 
found that police harassment, demands for bribes, confiscation of goods, and physical vio-
lence were all more common in Limpopo than Cape Town (Table 5). 
Table 5: Challenges Faced by Refugee Entrepreneurs in South Africa 
Cape Town (% often/sometimes) Limpopo (% often/sometimes)
Theft of goods/stock 56.7 38.7
Theft of money/income 44.2 31.8
Physical violence by South Africans 23.5 19.2
Confiscation of goods by police 10.2 19.1
Harassment/demands for bribes by police 10.7 26.5
Physical violence by police 6.8 8.8
Verbal insults 32.6 35.7
Prejudice against my nationality 48.0 47.9
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BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS AND STRATEGIES
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, the 
sampled Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range 
of economic activities. The vast majority of the sample in both locations are in the retail 
sector (75-79%), followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4-8%) (Table 6). The 
kinds of goods being sold and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled 
Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, con-
fectionary, soft drinks, and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items 
sold are cigarettes, clothing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and bever-
ages (Table 7). Comparing the two, the main difference lies in the greater numbers of refu-
gees selling confectionary, toiletries and cosmetics, and household products in Limpopo.
Table 6: Economic Sector of Refugee Enterprises
Cape Town Limpopo 
No. % No. %
Retail, trade and wholesale 400 79.4 378 75.0
Manufacturing 38 7.5 22 4.4
Services 128 25.4 143 28.4
Other 1 0.2 1 0.2
Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and 
other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they 
are selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of 
either group, it is clear from comparison with a control group of 1,000 South Africans in 
Limpopo and Cape Town that different market niches are occupied. This is particularly evi-
dent in the sale of fresh and cooked food (where South Africans are clearly in the majority 
in both locations) and footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products 
(where refugees predominate) (Table 7). With regard to services, the main difference is in 
hair braiding and hair salons where there are more refugees than South Africans involved 
in both Limpopo and Cape Town.
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Table 7: Goods and Services Offered by Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs
Cape Town Limpopo
Refugee  
%
South African 
% 
Refugee  
%
South African 
%
Retail
Soft drinks (e.g. Coke, Fanta) 23.0 12.4 21.6 13.8
Cigarettes 21.4 6.6 18.5 19.3
Clothing and footwear 18.8 12.4 20.2 3.5
Personal accessories (e.g. bags, sunglasses) 14.5 8.2 18.5 4.2
Confectionary (sweets/candies and cakes) 13.7 10.8 20.2 23.5
Fresh produce (fruits and vegetables) 11.3 17.3 15.5 35.7
Toiletries and cosmetics 9.5 3.4 20.0 4.4
Cooked food ready to eat 7.5 19.9 6.0 17.1
Electronics 6.3 1.4 8.7 2.1
Arts and crafts 5.0 1.4 0.2 0.9
Books/newspapers 3.8 0.8 2.0 0.5
Household products 3.6 2.4 15.1 4.2
Hardware/tools 1.6 1.8 2.8 0.5
Music/film CDs/DVDs 1.0 0.8 4.2 1.4
Car parts 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2
Livestock (e.g. chickens) 0.2 2.4 0.2 1.1
Alcohol 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.6
Other 9.9 13.5 18.5 16.8
Services
Haircutting and braiding 10.9 5.0 19.2 7.6
IT/internet 4.4 1.2 1.0 0.7
Telephone 1.6 0.0 1.6 2.3
Shoe repairs 1.2 2.0 0.2 1.9
Traditional doctor 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
Accommodation 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Car repairs 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.6
Medicine (pharmacy) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
Transportation (taxi/passengers) 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2
Car wash 0.0 2.6 0.8 4.1
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Financial 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5
Rentals 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4
Transportation (goods) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Construction 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Car parking/guarding 0.0 3.8 0.0 1.1
Other 5.4 5.2 5.8 5.5
The primary sources of business start-up capital in both areas were very similar, sug-
gesting that being in a large city does not provide additional financing opportunities (Table 
8). Approximately 85% of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo used 
their personal savings to start their business. Around 20% of both groups used loans from 
relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives and 12% gifts from relatives. A small number in 
both areas used remittances from outside the country to establish their businesses. Only 
a handful of refugees in both areas were able to access funding from banks, NGOs or the 
UNHCR. The only difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were 
able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses. 
Table 8: Primary Sources of Refugee Start-Up Capital
Cape Town % Limpopo %
Personal savings 85.9 84.3
Loan from relatives 19.8 20.2
Gift from relatives 13.7 11.7
Loan from non-relatives 12.1 14.3
Loan from church 2.4 0.2
Money from relatives in another country 2.4 2.4
Loan from mosque 1.4 0.2
Loan from informal financial institutions 1.2 1.4
Bank loan 0.8 1.2
Loan from government agency 0.2 0.0
Goods on credit 0.0 9.1
Loan or grant from NGO 0.0 1.4
Loan or grant from UNHCR 0.0 0.4
Usurers/mashonisa (money lenders) 0.0 0.2
Other source 2.2 6.9
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Despite the similarities in sources of start-up capital, the amounts needed to establish 
a business did differ. In Limpopo, the sampled refugee entrepreneurs seemed to be able to 
start a business with less capital. Thirty-four percent had less than ZAR5,000 compared to 
21% of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and 63% had less than ZAR10,000 compared 
to 52% of the Cape Town entrepreneurs. At the other end of the scale, 27% of the sampled 
Cape Town refugees had more than ZAR50,000 in start-up capital compared to only 15% 
of those in Limpopo.
Figure 3: Amount of Start-Up Capital Used by Refugee Entrepreneurs
Despite their lack of prior business experience, refugees in South Africa have devel-
oped strategies to maximize their returns. Table 9 lists a variety of business strategies and 
shows how many sampled refugees employ them in the conduct of their business. The most 
common strategies include bulk purchasing, extended hours of operation, keeping busi-
ness records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy goods on credit, 
and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppliers and the media for 
information about the price of goods. These are all commonsense business strategies and 
certainly do not fall into the category of underhand and secret tactics that the South African 
Minister of Small Business Development has accused them of employing. There was very 
little difference in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees. 
Living in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiat-
ing with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs, however. 
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Almost one-third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, 
while most Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city. This probably affords the 
latter greater opportunity for bulk buying, negotiation with suppliers and information-
sharing. 
Table 9: Business Strategies of Refugee Entrepreneurs
Operational Strategies Cape Town % Limpopo %
Obtain price information from other entrepreneurs 75.6 57.9
Purchase stock in bulk 69.7 56.3
Extended hours of operation 69.5 65.5
Negotiate prices with suppliers 67.7 59.8
Keep business records 59.4 55.7
Call suppliers for information on prices 57.2 61.2
Negotiate prices with customers 47.8 60.5
Offer credit to customers 42.0 44.8
Sell goods more cheaply than competitors 42.0 38.6
Charge different prices for different customers 37.1 30.3
Give discounts to regular customers 34.9 39.1
Consult media for price information 31.9 28.1
Partner with other businesses to distribute risk 28.1 34.2
Engage in shareholding 10.3 25.9
Purchase insurance 3.2 7.0
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMIES
In this study, we use two measures of business success: (a) net monthly profit and (b) the 
difference between the current value of the enterprise and the initial capital outlay. With 
regard to the first indicator, net profit, it is clear that although refugees in Limpopo are able 
to start a business with a smaller capital outlay than those in Cape Town, their enterprises 
are not as profitable. The sampled Limpopo refugees earned less on average than their Cape 
Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 per month compared to ZAR11,315 in Cape Town (Table 
10). Only one-third of the sampled Cape Town entrepreneurs made less than ZAR5,000 
per month compared to 58% of those in Limpopo. Or again, 70% of the Limpopo entrepre-
neurs make less than ZAR7,500 per month compared to only 49% of those in Cape Town. 
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Table 10: Net Monthly Profit of Refugee Entrepreneurs
Cape Town Limpopo 
% cumulative % % cumulative %
<= ZAR2,500 14.7 14.7 18.1 18.1
ZAR2,501–ZAR5,000 18.6 33.3 40.0 58.1
ZAR5,001–ZAR7,500 15.5 48.8 10.9 70.0
ZAR7,501–ZAR 10,000 15.3 73.1 12.7 82.7
ZAR10,001–ZAR 12,500 6.2 79.3 3.0 85.7
ZAR12,501–ZAR 15,000 8.8 88.1 5.1 90.8
ZAR15,001–ZAR 17,500 1.4 89.5 2.3 93.1
ZAR17,501–ZAR 20,000 6.5 96.0 3.9 95.0
>ZAR20,000 4.0 100.0 5.0 100.0
As regards the second indicator of business success – the difference between the amount 
of start-up capital and the current value of the enterprise – in both Cape Town and Lim-
popo there are clear indications of increased value. For example, 21% of the sampled entre-
preneurs in Cape Town started with less than ZAR5,000 but only 3% of the businesses were 
currently valued at less than ZAR5,000 (Table 11). In Limpopo, the equivalent figures were 
34% (start-up) and 14% (current value). In both locations, therefore, there was significant 
upward movement out of the lowest value category. A similar pattern can be observed with 
businesses that started with less than ZAR20,000. In Cape Town, 51% fell into this start-up 
category but only 26% of businesses fell into this value category. The proportion of sampled 
business in the ZAR50,000-plus category increased from 27% to 47% and in Limpopo from 
15% to 42%. This suggests that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better 
in Limpopo than they are in Cape Town.
The establishment and growth of sampled refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for 
a variety of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers 
including wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers. 
Around two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase 
supplies from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage (Table 
12). Other beneficiaries vary in relative importance, reflecting the difference between oper-
ating in a large city and a small town. For example, refugees in Cape Town are more likely to 
patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize 
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small shops. The fact that more Cape Town refugees purchase directly from farms is pri-
marily a reflection of the existence of a market gardening area (the Philippi Horticultural 
Area) within the city limits.39 The average monthly spend at wholesalers was very similar in 
both Cape Town and Limpopo. Otherwise, the amounts spent varied considerably but, in 
general, the more important the source, the greater the amount spent.
Table 11: Increase in Value of Refugee Enterprises
Cape Town Limpopo 
Start-up % Current value % Start-up % Current value %
<ZAR5,000 21.4 3.4 33.6 13.6
ZAR5,000–ZAR9,999 14.1 9.2 12.2 9.5
ZAR10,000–ZAR19,999 16.2 13.0 17.1 11.8
ZAR20,000–ZAR29,999 7.1 13.2 10.9 11.6
ZAR30,000–ZAR49,999 14.1 14.1 10.9 11.8
ZAR50,000–ZAR99,999 12.6 20.2 8.8 13.2
ZAR100,000–ZAR199,999 10.4 15.2 4.7 15.2
ZAR200,000–ZAR499,999 3.9 10.3 1.5 10.7
ZAR500,000–ZAR999,999 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.8
>ZAR1,000,000 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.7
Table 12: Main Suppliers Used by Refugee Entrepreneurs
Cape Town Limpopo Cape Town Limpopo
No. No.
Average 
monthly 
spend (ZAR)
Average 
monthly 
spend (ZAR)
Wholesaler 323 292 34,565 34,908
Direct from factory 64 18 9,575 20,278
Supermarkets 49 37 12,253 3,979
Fresh produce markets 28 21 28,021 2,000
Non-South African informal sector producers/retailers 24 43 9,121 15,549
Small shops/retailers 21 90 3,738 6,876
South African informal sector producers/retailers 13 19 7,631 3,859
Direct from farms 8 4 19,625 4,875
Other sources 28 18 14,855 4,586
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The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South 
African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to 
pay income tax, they do pay value-added tax (VAT) on most goods purchased from formal 
sector suppliers. One Ethiopian refugee in a Limpopo focus group observed that they not 
only paid VAT on goods but were unable to claim rebates:
There are many things we do to help the economy. We operate our businesses 
and we buy our stock from the wholesalers. We pay VAT there so our money 
is going into the economy. We pay a lot of money that way. Some of our people 
go to buy goods that are worth ZAR200,000 or even more. Some buy every 
week and some buy every day. So imagine if you are paying ZAR200,000 for 
goods and VAT is 14% so that is more than ZAR25,000 I am paying to the 
government. Even after paying this large amount of VAT we suffer because we 
cannot claim some of it because we do not have the documents. We are not 
registered. If we were registered, at the end of the year we would claim some of 
the VAT like South Africans do. We are actually paying more and contributing 
more through VAT than most South African small businesses.40
Another participant claimed that business registration was impossible because “govern-
ment does not want to register us.”41
Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners:
South Africans are surviving on us because we pay them money to rent their 
shops. I pay ZAR4,000 per month to my landlord to use the shop. That is a lot 
of money. How many local people can afford to pay that money? Locals do not 
pay that kind of money when they rent. They will pay ZAR1,000 or ZAR1,500 
only, not ZAR4,000. We pay because we have no choice, we want to do business 
and survive. 
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, 
this was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%) (Table 13). However, the average monthly 
rentals paid to landlords were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in 
Limpopo. Renting also provides refugees with a modicum of protection. As one noted: “If 
your landlord is respected or feared, then you are okay because the thugs will not come and 
break in.”42 The Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs were more likely to own their business 
premises, although the numbers were small (7.4% compared to 2.2% in Limpopo). 
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Table 13: Occupancy Status of Business Premises
Cape Town 
%
Limpopo  
%
Cape Town 
monthly 
rent (ZAR)
Limpopo 
monthly 
rent (ZAR)
Pay rent to private owner who is a South African 
(company or individual) 53.6 65.9 7,541 4,838
Pay rent to council/municipality 21.5 3.8 860 879
Pay rent to private owner who is not a South African 
(company or individual) 9.4 8.8 2,800 3,180
Owner or part-owner 7.4 2.2
Rent-free, with permission 5.2 6.4
Rent-free, without permission 1.2 10.6
Share space/premises with others 0.0 0.4
Other 1.6 1.8
Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with 
refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for 
business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only 4% 
in Limpopo. Rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month compared 
to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based refugees 
(and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality. The cost 
of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared to only 
ZAR752 per year in Limpopo.
Fifth, there is a growing consensus in the research literature that migrant businesses in 
the informal economy create jobs for South Africans, and that this needs to be acknowl-
edged by government. As one refugee observed: “The government does not want to accept 
that we are contributing. When they talk about us they make it look like we are only taking, 
taking and taking from the South Africans.”43 Another pointed out the mutual benefits of 
employing South Africans:
We employ a lot of South Africans. If your business starts to grow, you employ, 
not only our people from Ethiopia, but also locals. They help with customers 
and other things. They speak the language and understand quickly what the 
customer wants. Even though I understand the language, there are words that I 
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do not know and so it is better when you employ a South African, they will talk 
and agree and I will communicate with my employee. The locals need work and 
we also need workers, so it is a mutual benefit.44 
Some refugees also find that employing South Africans is a form of security against 
theft, although it can be a double-edged sword:
It is good security because they will know the local thugs and thieves and so they 
may tell them to leave you alone. If you have a bad employee, they may connive 
with the thieves and steal from you, so it is both ways. Sometimes we employ 
locals that we know, when we know their parents and we talk to them so that 
they do not steal and run away. It is better to employ someone from around the 
area, someone in the community.45
Around half (52%) of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) 
of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses (Table 14). In terms of 
the profile of employees, the Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were equally likely to 
employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created). While the Lim-
popo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total employees), both 
groups preferred to hire South African women over men (with 65-70% of South African 
employees in both sites being female). What this suggests is that, in both large cities and 
small urban areas, refugee entrepreneurs may be providing jobs for more South African 
women than men and thereby contributing to lowering the female unemployment rate. 
Table 14: Employment Generation by Refugee Enterprises
Cape Town Limpopo 
No. % No. %
Male South African 66 17.7 37 11.8
Female South African 120 32.2 82 26.1
Male from home country 101 27.2 81 25.8
Female from home country 28 7.5 26 8.3
Male from other countries 35 9.4 37 11.8
Female from other countries 22 5.6 51 16.2
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Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that 
one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South 
African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from for-
mal sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure, 
luxuries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating. One 
group of five Zimbabwean refugees in Cape Town (including a former teacher), for exam-
ple, operate a panel-beating and spray-painting business in an industrial area of the city. 
In a focus group, they discussed at length how and why they had established the business, 
their business challenges and the nature of the service they offer to South Africans:
We are very good at this business. There are many people who come here 
because they cannot afford to repair their cars in these expensive garages, so we 
are offering them services otherwise they would not be driving their cars. That is 
a good service we are offering. Some of the customers actually go to the garages 
first and the charges there will make them come to us.46 
These refugees also argued, in a prescient manner, that their activities saved the South 
African government and the UNHCR from having to support them. As one commented: 
“In Europe the governments look after the refugees and every month they get paid like they 
are working. But here we are working for ourselves and are saving the government a lot of 
money.”47
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on urban refugee livelihoods in the global 
South and, in particular, to a small but growing body of work on urban refugee entrepre-
neurship in cities of refuge.48 The concept of “refugee economies” is a valuable starting 
point for restoring agency, self-reliance and innovation to populations all too often rep-
resented as passive victims. One of the defining characteristics of many large cities in the 
rapidly urbanizing South is the high degree of informality of shelter, services and economic 
livelihoods. As one study argues, this involves “highly mobile and provisional possibilities 
for how people live and make things, how they use the urban environment and collaborate 
with one another.”49 Furthermore, these urban spaces provide for “upscaling a variety of 
entrepreneurial activities through the dense intersections of actors from different countries 
and situations.”50 It is these dynamic, shifting and dangerous informal urban spaces that 
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refugees often arrive in with few resources other than a will to survive, a few social contacts 
and a drive to support themselves in the absence of financial support from the host govern-
ment and international agencies.
South Africa is sometimes hailed as having an extremely progressive refugee protec-
tion regime by the standards of the rest of Africa. Refugees enjoy freedoms denied in other 
countries, including the right to move and live anywhere and the right to work and be 
self-employed. Many opt for employment and self-employment in the informal economy 
because they find it extremely difficult to access the formal labour market or to establish 
and operate a business in the formal economy. Newly-arrived refugees, including those with 
advanced skills and professional qualifications, initially find themselves accepting menial 
work on construction sites or as dishwashers in restaurants. Those with relatives or friends 
already in the country often work in their informal businesses until they have saved enough 
money to launch their own. They start small and with extremely hard work, self-sacrifice 
and hardship, their businesses take off. South Africa, then, provides an important example 
of refugee self-reliance, motivation and agency through informal entrepreneurship.
At the same time, South Africa is one of the most xenophobic countries in the world and 
migrants of any kind are extremely unwelcome. Large-scale violence directed at migrants 
and refugees wracked the country in 2008 and again in 2015. In between, extreme xeno-
phobia, in the form of violent attacks on migrant and refugee-owned shops and small busi-
nesses, has escalated. The state refuses to acknowledge that xenophobia exists, much less 
that something should be done about it. Attacks on foreign businesses are dismissed as 
general criminality, which might be an acceptable rhetorical position if there was evidence 
that the police provide adequate protection and justice for the victims. The evidence of 
human rights observers, previous studies, and confirmed here, is that policing is lackadai-
sical at best and certainly does very little to protect refugees from re-victimization in their 
chosen country of refuge. The fact that informal businesses started and run by refugees 
have become a particular target means that the South African city has become a hazardous 
place for refugee entrepreneurs.
Refugee economic opportunity and entrepreneurial activity is likely to vary significantly 
between camp and urban environments. This report addresses the question of variability 
between urban environments within the same destination country by comparing refugee 
entrepreneurship in the large city of Cape Town with a population of over 3 million and 
several small towns in the predominantly rural province of Limpopo, none larger than 
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150,000. The research shows that refugee entrepreneurial activity in Limpopo is a more 
recent phenomenon and largely a function of refugees moving away from large cities such 
as Johannesburg where their businesses and lives are in greater danger. While Somali refu-
gees predominate in Cape Town and Ethiopian refugees in Limpopo, the refugee popula-
tions in both areas are equally diverse and tend to be engaged in the same wide range of 
activities. Less start-up capital is needed in Limpopo but the refugees in both areas pursue 
similar business strategies and make similar contributions to the local economy. They face 
many of the same business challenges, including problems with documentation and the 
refusal of banks to offer credit, although small town policing appears to be harsher and 
more corrupt. While South African consumers clearly benefit from and appreciate their 
presence, migrant entrepreneurs are more vulnerable to xenophobic violence in Cape Town 
than Limpopo. In short, different urban geographies do shape the local nature of refu-
gee entrepreneurial economies, but there are also remarkable similarities in the manner 
in which unconnected refugee entrepreneurs establish and grow their businesses in large 
cities and small provincial towns. 
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One of the defining characteristics of many large cities in the rapidly urbanizing 
global South is the high degree of informality of shelter, services and economic 
livelihoods. It is these dynamic, shifting and dangerous informal urban spaces that 
refugees often arrive in with few resources other than a will to survive, a few social 
contacts and a drive to support themselves in the absence of financial support from 
the host government and international agencies. This report addresses the question 
of variability in economic opportunity and entrepreneurial activity between urban 
environments within the same destination country – South Africa – by comparing 
refugee entrepreneurship in Cape Town, South Africa’s second largest city, and 
several small towns in the province of Limpopo. The research shows that refugee 
entrepreneurial activity in Limpopo is a more recent phenomenon and largely a 
function of refugees moving from large cities such as Johannesburg where their 
businesses and lives are in greater danger. The refugee populations in both areas 
are equally diverse and tend to be engaged in the same wide range of activities. This 
report shows that different urban geographies do shape the local nature of refugee 
entrepreneurial economies, but there are also remarkable similarities in the manner 
in which unconnected refugee entrepreneurs establish and grow their businesses in 
large cities and small provincial towns. 
